The Software War - Joint Strike Fighter

 

 

Link-16 - GPS & The real "kill-switch"

Specifically, Link-16 and GPS access are key for the proper functioning of Europe’s F-35s, as they connect these birds to the larger, interoperable NATO defense networks and allow for precision guidance and strike during combat. And don’t forget the importance of the key software, logistics support, and even the overall supply chain for maintaining Europe’s fleet of F-35s.

It all runs from and through the United States. So long as relations are good between the various European members of NATO, this is not a problem. But let’s just look at the recent (and ongoing) contretemps between Washington and Copenhagen over the fate of Greenland.

According to The Aviationist, a popular online industry publication, systems like ALIS and ODIN, which are part of the overarching logistical, maintenance, and mission data support functions for ensuring the F-35 operates effectively remain sourced from the United States. It wouldn’t take much for Washington to interrupt support for these essential services that maintain the F-35’s fighting prowess.

ALIS and ODIN: The (troubled) Backbone of Global F-35 Sustainment

ALIS, which stands for “Autonomic Logistics Information System”, was planned as the core logistical infrastructure for the global F-35 fleet, according to the Lockheed Martin official website. Conceptually, ALIS integrates maintenance and data prognostics, supply chain and parts tracking, mission planning and debriefing data, and aircraft health reporting and technical information.

ALIS was designed to run on local servers and client hardware that interacted with the aircraft and ground personnel, per National Defense Magazine. Then there’s the Operational Data Integrated Network (ODIN). The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) official military webpage elaborates that ODIN was the next-generation replacement for ALIS, designed to overcome ALIS’ assessed shortcomings.

JSF states that ODIN is a “cloud-native,” meaning that much of its software and data environment exists in modern cloud servers rather than isolated, local servers. Due to this, ODIN’s designers believe that the system is more flexible, user-friendly, secure, and faster to update than ALIS.

While both systems have similar mission sets, the two platforms are structurally distinct. The Government Accountability Office explains that ALIS was built around local data servers, client workstations, aircraft interfaces (the F-35 can download its health and sensor data and upload that same information via data links when on the ground), prognostics engines, and supply chain plus parts management.

ALIS has been criticized for being heavy, with slow hardware and outdated software stacks. There are also data inaccuracies, missing records, and frequent manual workarounds that need to be employed. The GAO reports that ALIS is hard to deploy in expeditionary or shipboard environments, too, due to its size and weight.

ODIN, meanwhile, is where things tend to get interesting from a software perspective. It maintains the same high-level functions as ALIS, but it employs major architectural enhancements. For instance, it is a Cloud-Hosted Backend, and its hardware is smaller and ruggedized compared to ALIS. These systems can also connect to aircraft and act as local nodes to the battle cloud. Web/cloud applications make this system infinitely user-friendly. What’s more, the ODIN system allows for seamless software updates. It operates in an integrated data environment.

The Backbone of the F-35: Understanding ALIS

ALIS (Autonomic Logistics Information System) is a shared overarching system made of several components with development roots dating back to 2002. Every F-35 squadron possesses an ALIS package that connects directly to the global network.

During flight, devices within the aircraft track an incredible amount of data from all onboard sensors. Once an F-35 returns to base, this data is transferred to the ground-based segment of ALIS via a portable memory device (known as the PMD or “the brick”) or a laptop PMD reader.

The Data Flow: From Base to Global Network

The system relies on a specific bi-directional communication flow, moving data from the squadron level up to a centralized global hub:

• 1. Standard Operating Unit (SOU): This is the first step in the chain. The SOU (servers) downloads and analyzes information immediately after a mission. There are distinct SOU setups: one for classified aircraft-related data and one for unclassified aircraft-related data.
• 2. Central Point of Entry (CPE): The SOU sends data up to the national CPE. This is a server unit configured to provide software and data distribution for a nation’s entire F-35 fleet. It utilizes two units to process and store classified and unclassified data separately. (Note: The US utilizes separate CPEs for operational commands and training sites.)
• 3. Autonomic Logistic Operating Unit (ALOU): From the national CPE, data is transferred to the central server, known as the ALOU. This is based in Fort Worth, Texas, and is run by LMCO. It consists of two servers (classified and unclassified) and functions as the central hub to upload patches back to F-35 users.
  

Beyond Logistics: Tactical Application

While ALIS is famous for maintenance, it is equally essential for mission planning and debriefing. The system collects tactical data, including flight routes, identified threats, and hazards. This data is then shared worldwide with all American and foreign F-35 operators.

Software Is the New High Ground in Warfare

Software is key to the functioning of the F-35. As anyone who has ever used a computer understands, software—notably for complex systems, like the F-35—must be constantly updated. The source code and updates are controlled by Washington and Europe is disallowed from updating or changing the software on their F-35s without explicit approval from the United States. That alone is an astonishing exploitable security vulnerability.

Recently, Denmark outlined a plan to rotate around 1,000 of their forces through Greenland in the ensuing months after Trump’s recent eruption over Greenland’s status as a territory of Denmark. That force is not just a Danish element. It includes other NATO members, notably France. The Danish Royal Navy has deployed a warship to Greenland, while the French Navy has supposedly deployed submarines off the coast all meant to deter the Americans from militarily absorbing the island into their country.

Airpower, of course, is an essential component of modern warfare. Copenhagen knows this. What’s more, they’re aware of the fact that their F-35 fleet (and the rest of Europe’s) are completely vulnerable to disruptions imposed by the United States, should hostilities over Denmark become more than just diplomatic posturing. These technical and logistical dependencies are wonderfully convenient, when all is well in the transatlantic alliance. But they become massive weaknesses when a fight breaks out among the allies.

Germany’s Sudden Discovery of Strategic Vulnerability

It is interesting, too, that Germany is the nation decrying these American-created vulnerabilities in Europe’s airpower. After all, Germany has long been the beating economic heart of the European economy.

Even today, as that economic miracle has faded after the destruction of the Nord Stream II Pipeline connecting Russian natural gas to thirsty European consumers via Germany and the Baltic Sea, Germany is now leading the rearmament push in Europe (ironic, NATO was supposedly created to “Keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down”). Berlin is clearly concerned about the overwhelming influence that America’s defense contractors have over European markets.

In fact, with Germany’s economy in the doldrums since losing access to cheap Russian energy sources—and with rearmament the new buzzword in Europe today—Germany seems to be banking on becoming a potent player in Europe’s arms market. By emphasizing both the Russian threat in the East and now the threat of American duplicity, Berlin could try to carve out a competitive spot against the Americans for Europe’s arms markets.

The True Cost of Buying American

There is no (verified) hidden kill switch embedded within US-made military platforms, such as the F-35 that lets the Pentagon instantly turn off allied weapons. What does exist is an extreme dependency in Europe upon US-controlled software infrastructure, supply chains, and policy preferences that lean in the direction of the United States and its security interests.

This explains why some commentators, such as the controversial Steve Bannon often describe Europe as “vassals” of the United States. However derisive that may sound to European ears, judging from the German concerns being voiced in this piece, it sounds an awful lot like the Europeans are realizing how vulnerable they truly are.

Whether the Europeans can fundamentally alter this imbalance in the near-term is unknown. Until that imbalance is remedied, however, the Europeans will have to play-nice with the Americans lest they find out the hard way how vulnerable to American whims they are.

 

Story From - National Defense by  Brandon J. Weichert 

Media From - GAO analysis of DOD Documents - F-35 Joint Program Office & Lockheed-Martin