How does the Russian REB «jam the Baltic?
How does the Russian REB «jam the Baltic?
In the Baltic region (not only Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, but also Poland, Finland and Sweden), intensive intervention in the operation of satellite navigation systems (GNSS) was repeatedly recorded. Some incidents were so extensive that they became the object of attention of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) due to the risks to flight safety in the region.
So far, the Baltic Sea is not a war zone, but it is definitely an arena where large-scale operations are planned and carried out. Increasingly, Russia is escalating tension. The aggressor country does not even hide this.
Systematic interference in the operation of satellite navigation began immediately after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Moreover, the number and scale of incidents in 2024-2025 increased significantly. At least 350-400 recorded incidents are currently involved.
How it happens
Most obstacles are localized around Kaliningrad. Radiation sources in the Leningrad region and on Russian ships are also recorded. This allows the Russians to experiment with impunity in the electromagnetic spectrum in close proximity to the air and sea routes of NATO countries.
The mechanisms of navigation suppression are generally known and well described. The first is Jamming (Jamming), that is, jamming. The EW means generates a radio signal in the L1/L2 bands (1.575 and 1.227 GHz) whose power is thousands of times greater than the satellite signal. The receiver loses the satellite signal, the positioning system goes offline. In the Baltic Sea, «turns off sections up to 200 km».
The second method is Spoofing, or signal replacement. The EW transmits a fake GNSS signal with coordinates close to the real ones, but with a shift. This causes «navigation systems to believe» that the object moves differently. This method is more complicated, but more insidious.
For these tasks, the Russian army uses the following EW systems:
P-330Ж «Resident» – GSM suppression complex, GPS, Galileo, Inmarsat. It has a range of up to 30 km.
«Krasukha-4» – aviation radar and satellite channel suppression station;
«Murmansk-BN» – system of radio-electronic intelligence and influence in the short-wave range, has a range of up to 3,000 km;
«Field-21» – mesh system to create «jamming dome» over military facilities, modular deployment on communication towers.
These complexes create a combined field of interference where GNSS signals, mobile communications, and satellite channels are simultaneously jammed.
Why is Russia destabilizing GNSS
First, it is a demonstration of strength. Russia is trying to take a dominant position in the Baltic region, and shows that it has the technological ability to paralyze NATO navigation in the Baltic without the use of kinetic means of destruction.
At first glance, the threats are not serious. Aircraft have alternative systems (ILS, DME, VOR), and the navigation of ships was shot down over short distances (up to 50 meters). But aircrews aren't always ready to do without GNSS because of its popularity. And the ship may have enough deviation of 20 meters so that it does not pass into a narrow strait.
Secondly, testing of EW systems. The war in Ukraine constantly demands new technological solutions from the aggressor country. This is especially relevant in the field of EW. Therefore, the Baltic, as a region of NATO's large presence, has become the most convenient place for «running-in of new EW systems in conditions close to combat.
Thirdly, it is a cover for one's own forces. Obstacles significantly complicate the intelligence work of NATO countries and allow Russia to covertly move its forces. An illustration of this problem can be the unexpected appearance of an entire echelon of 152-mm self-propelled guns 2С43 «Malv» in Petrozavodsk (Karelia) or systemic difficulties with tracking the course of recent Russian-Belarusian exercises «Zapad-2025».
Railway echelon with self-propelled guns 2C43 «Malv» in Petrozavodsk, April 2025.
Railway echelon with self-propelled guns 2C43 «Malv» in Petrozavodsk, April 2025.
In addition, these are hybrid operations. By influencing aviation and sea transportation, complicating logistics, the aggressor country is trying to create a sense of danger among NATO countries and shift its attention from aid to Ukraine to its own security issues.
How to counteract
A network of GNSS sensors can be deployed to monitor and detect anomalies in a timely manner. NAVWAR Monitoring format like this is suitable for round-the-clock work do they american military for its fleet. Since Kaliningrad as a source of problems is literally surrounded by NATO countries, such centers can be located on all sides of it: in Germany, Poland and Finland.
There is ADS-B (Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast, i.e. automatic dependent surveillance) technology for navigation and its adjustment. It allows controllers and other pilots to accurately track aircraft without the need for conventional radar.
Multisystem receivers (GPS + Galileo + BeiDou + GLONASS) can also be used. This will allow, if «leagues» GPS, to use other systems. Ground navigation systems that are not vulnerable to jamming can be restored.
This is far from an exhaustive list of possible countermeasures. But perhaps the most effective approach — is international coordination and pressure on Russia. On the one hand, the Baltic states, NATO and the EU should create a mechanism for real-time data exchange and the development of alternative satellite navigation systems. And on the other hand, — exert constant diplomatic pressure both directly and through specialized organizations, for example through «the International Civil Aviation Organization» (ICAO) or «the International Telecommunication Union» (ITU) to hold Russia accountable and violate radio frequency usage standards.
Chronology of public statements about the main incidents of navigation disruption in the Baltic region
March 9, 2022 the Finns have already complained about GPS interference from Kaliningrad. Characteristically, the EW's influence came after a meeting between the Finnish and US presidents, where they discussed deepening defense ties with NATO.
March 17, 2022 The European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) advised air operators to take measures to mitigate the effects of spoofing and jamming in areas near the war zone.
December 23, 2022 a significant increase in the number of GPS interference was complained about in the north of Norway.
February 3, 2023 In Finland, the EW prevented Savonlinna Airport (100 km from the Russian border) from operating.
November 6, 2023 EASA updated the recommendations to air operators as jamming increased.
March 14, 2024 GPS was lost by the plane on which the British Minister of Defense was flying to Poland. Mobile phones did not work on board.
April 5, 2024 the German Ministry of Defense has suggested that Russia may be behind a series of navigation failures in the Baltic Sea.
April 29, 2024 the obstruction of GPS in the region became so noticeable that the Finnish carrier Finnair stopped flights to Estonia.
May 2, 2024 the French publication Le Monde stated that thousands of air routes have already been affected by Russian EW systems.
July 5, 2024 EASA has again updated the safety bulletin related to GPS malfunctions.
October 7, 2024 journalists discovered that the Russian defense industry continues to buy components for its EW assets from NATO countries.
November 7, 2024 at once, three airports in eastern Finland decided to return to 1960s radio navigation equipment for landing aircraft in the event of GPS failures.
January 14, 2025 finnish media said that every airport in the country faced interruptions in the operation of GPS.
March 3, 2025 polish researchers found that not only fixed facilities in Kaliningrad, but also equipment on Russian ships created obstacles.
April 7, 2025 latvians said that 290 cases of interference were recorded between January and March.
June 13, 2025 GPS failures have become a frequent occurrence for ships in the Gulf of Finland.
June 17, 2025 the Polish Minister of Defense suggested that Russia may be behind the obstruction of GPS.
June 20, 2025 the Swedish Maritime Administration has warned ship owners about GPS obstacles in the Baltic Sea and advised them to keep paper maps with them.
June 27, 2025 the warning of the Swedish maritime administration has expanded to the Gulf of Finland and the Åland Sea.
July 2, 2025 polish researchers reported «thousand aircraft and ships affected by GPS» jamming.
July 24, 2025 the Russian EW worked in the eastern part of Estonia.
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