Belta.by as a RU cyber tool

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Bel-TA: An Analysis of a Union State Information Warfare Asset

I. Strategic Overview

This report provides a comprehensive analysis of the Belarusian Telegraph Agency (BelTA), the state-owned national news agency of the Republic of Belarus. The assessment, based on open-source intelligence, concludes that BelTA is not a conventional media organization but a fully integrated instrument of state power. It operates as a primary tool for internal information control for the regime of Aleksandr Lukashenka and, of increasing strategic importance, functions as a forward-deployed asset within the information warfare doctrine of the Russia-Belarus Union State.

BelTA's legal structure as a "republican unitary enterprise" solidifies its status as an arm of the Belarusian government, with a mandate to disseminate official narratives. Its leadership consists of individuals personally loyal to Lukashenka who are under international sanctions for their role in state propaganda. This demonstrates a deliberate policy of prioritizing information control over journalistic integrity. Financially, the agency is sustained through a combination of direct state funding and commercial activities, which include providing technical services like website development and hosting to other government bodies, thereby creating a centralized and state-controlled digital ecosystem.

Technically, BelTA's digital infrastructure is deliberately siloed within Belarus, a strategy that trades global resilience for sovereign control, insulating it from foreign corporate or legal action while creating a concentrated target for adversaries. This infrastructure supports an operation deeply intertwined with Russia's information apparatus. Historically subordinate to the Soviet TASS agency, BelTA now operates as a partner within the deeply asymmetrical power structure of the Union State. This relationship is being formalized through the creation of a joint Russia-Belarus media holding, designed to operate under a "unified, coordinated policy," effectively institutionalizing Kremlin oversight and transforming BelTA into a component of Russia's strategic communication framework.

The agency's content output confirms its role as a propaganda vehicle. It engages in systematic glorification of the Lukashenka regime, propagates Kremlin-aligned disinformation narratives against Ukraine and the West, and actively participates in information operations targeting neighboring NATO states like Poland and Lithuania. This operational profile aligns with the historical and contemporary Russian modus operandi of utilizing state-controlled media entities as fronts and amplifiers for intelligence and influence operations.

Consequently, BelTA has been explicitly identified as a target by Ukrainian offensive cyber forces, including the state-sanctioned "IT Army of Ukraine." This designation is not aimed at a mere media outlet but at a critical node in the hybrid warfare machine confronting Ukraine. The analysis confirms that BelTA's function as a military-informational asset makes it a legitimate and strategically valuable target in the ongoing conflict.

II. Operational Profile of the Belarusian Telegraph Agency (BelTA)

The operational profile of the Belarusian Telegraph Agency (BelTA) is defined by its complete integration into the state apparatus of the Republic of Belarus. Its legal status, governance structure, and funding model collectively demonstrate an organization devoid of independence, functioning instead as a core component of the government's communication and control mechanisms.

A. Corporate and Legal Identity: An Arm of the State

BelTA's legal framework codifies its role as an extension of the Belarusian state. It is officially registered as a "republican unitary enterprise." In the legal context of Belarus, a unitary enterprise is a commercial organization not endowed with the right of ownership to the property assigned to it by the owner. This structure ensures that the state, as the sole owner, retains absolute control over the enterprise's assets, direction, and operations.

This state ownership is not merely a formality; it is central to the agency's mission. The official internet portal of the President of the Republic of Belarus explicitly defines BelTA's primary task as providing "unbiased and professional coverage of activities of the President, the Belarus President Administration, the Council of Ministers, and other government authorities." This mandate positions BelTA not as an independent observer of the government but as its designated chronicler and mouthpiece. It is, by its own government's definition, the "country's main source of official information."

This role has deep historical roots. The agency's lineage traces back to December 23, 1918, when it was established as a regional department of the Russian Telegraph Agency (ROSTA). Throughout the Soviet period, it remained functionally integrated into the centralized Soviet information system. This long history of operating as a component of a larger, state-directed, Moscow-centric information apparatus establishes a foundational precedent for its current role within the Russia-Belarus Union State.

B. Management and Governance: Loyalty and Sanctions

The leadership of BelTA is a clear indicator of the agency's function as a tool of the Lukashenka regime. Key positions are filled by individuals whose primary qualification appears to be personal loyalty and a proven record of disseminating state propaganda.

The current Director-General is Irina Borisovna Akulovich. Sanctions records from the European Union and Switzerland describe her as a "long-time supporter of Aliaksandr Lukashenka," and the rationale for her sanctioning is explicit: "As a head of BelTA, she sets the tone and direction of the news agency and views the media as a tool to preserve the current regime of the country. She is therefore supporting the Lukashenka regime."

This pattern predates Akulovich. Her predecessor, Dmitry Alexandrovich Zhuk, was also placed under EU sanctions for his responsibility for "relaying state propaganda in the media, which has supported and justified the repression of the democratic opposition and of civil society...using falsified information."

The consistent appointment of internationally sanctioned propagandists to lead BelTA is not accidental but reflects a deliberate policy choice by the Lukashenka regime to prioritize loyalty and propaganda effectiveness over journalistic integrity.

C. Funding and Economic Model: State Subsidies and Commercial Ventures

BelTA operates on a hybrid funding model that combines direct state support with a broad portfolio of commercial services. As a state-owned entity, BelTA is a direct beneficiary of government funding. Today, BelTA is officially described as a "diversified enterprise." Its commercial activities are extensive and go far beyond simple news distribution. The agency's products and services include:

• Information Products: Subscription-based access to a real-time newswire in multiple languages.
• Publishing: BelTA functions as a significant publishing house, producing newspapers, magazines, and books.
• Media Services: The agency operates a multifunctional press center in Minsk, hosting press conferences and seminars.
• Website Development and Hosting: Critically, BelTA offers a "full range of services" in website development, including hosting and maintenance for government agencies, companies, and institutions.

By acting as the web developer and hosting provider for other parts of the Belarusian government, BelTA moves beyond being a content creator to become a core component of the state's digital infrastructure. This centralization establishes BelTA as a high-value target in the context of cyber warfare.

III. Technical Infrastructure and Digital Footprint

The technical architecture supporting belta.by reveals a deliberate strategy of digital sovereignty and infrastructural control. The entire digital footprint of the agency, from domain registration to network hosting, is contained within the jurisdiction of Belarus.

A. Domain Registration and Network Services

Open-source WHOIS data confirms that every critical component of BelTA's online presence is managed by and through Belarusian entities. The domain registrar is a Belarusian company, the domain utilizes its own name servers, and the hosting provider is "Belarusian Cloud Technologies LLC."

B. Analysis of Hosting and Infrastructure

The decision to localize the entire technical stack is a significant strategic choice. This strategy of digital sovereignty makes the agency's digital assets immune to actions taken by foreign corporations or legal systems. However, this approach introduces significant vulnerabilities. The centralization of infrastructure within a single country creates a concentrated point of failure and makes belta.by a more straightforward target for cyber adversaries. This trade-off—sacrificing international resilience for absolute state control—underscores the regime's prioritization of security and information containment.

IV. Integration into the Russia-Belarus Union State Information Apparatus

BelTA's operational significance must be analyzed within the geopolitical framework of the Union State of Russia and Belarus. BelTA is evolving from a national news agency into a functional component of a unified Russian-Belarusian information warfare machine.

A. The Union State: A Framework for Subordination

The Union State is designed to achieve deep integration between Belarus and Russia. This dependency has transformed Belarus into what is effectively a "client state," where critical decisions are "made in Moscow, not Minsk." The two countries have created a "common defence space" and a "unified military space." In such a deeply integrated security environment, it is logical to conclude that information operations would be similarly integrated.

B. The Joint Media Holding: Formalizing Information Control

The most definitive step toward complete integration is the creation of a joint state media holding. In January 2024, Presidents Putin and Lukashenka signed a decree to establish a joint media company for the Union State. This new entity will operate under a "unified, coordinated policy." Given the stark power imbalance between Moscow and Minsk, this command will inevitably be directed from Russia. Under this new arrangement, BelTA and other Belarusian state media outlets will cease to function as purely Belarusian assets. They will become formal, integrated components of Russia's information warfare capabilities.

V. BelTA as an Instrument of State-Directed Information Warfare

A qualitative content analysis of BelTA's output reveals its primary function not as a news agency but as a state-controlled instrument for propaganda and disinformation.

A. Pro-Regime and Pro-Lukashenka Propaganda

A substantial volume of BelTA's content is dedicated to the creation and maintenance of a personality cult around President Aleksandr Lukashenka. The agency works to portray him not merely as a domestic leader but as a pivotal figure on the world stage, cultivating the image of a deep, personal, and "brotherly" relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin.

B. Anti-Ukraine Narratives and Disinformation

In its coverage of the war in Ukraine, BelTA functions as a direct amplifier of Kremlin-aligned propaganda. Its narratives are designed to justify Russia's aggression, demoralize Ukraine, and create the impression of Ukrainian military and political failure. This includes framing the invasion as a necessary response to Western aggression, portraying Ukrainian military operations as incompetent, promoting defeatism, and delegitimizing the Ukrainian state.

C. Anti-West/NATO Disinformation Campaigns

BelTA's information warfare efforts extend to a persistent campaign against the West, particularly the United States, NATO, and neighboring EU member states Poland and Lithuania. This campaign portrays the West as aggressive, hypocritical, and untrustworthy. BelTA is a key node in coordinated disinformation campaigns targeting its NATO neighbors, designed to polarize European societies and destabilize NATO's Eastern Flank.

VI. Assessed Links to Russian Military and Intelligence Services

While no public document explicitly confirms a direct command relationship, a high-confidence assessment is that BelTA is, at minimum, leveraged as an asset by Russian intelligence and is likely integrated into its information operations framework.

The use of state news agencies as a cover for intelligence activities has a long history in the Soviet Union, a model that has been adapted for the 21st century. The U.S. government has explicitly identified contemporary Russian media entities as being under the direct control of Russian intelligence services. BelTA, as a fully state-controlled media asset within a client state, fits this operational template perfectly. Utilizing BelTA as a conduit offers Russia a significant strategic advantage: plausible deniability.

VII. Vulnerability and Significance as a Cyber Warfare Target

The analysis culminates in a clear understanding of BelTA's significance as a high-value target in the cyber domain.

A. The Rationale for Targeting: From Media Outlet to Military-Informational Asset

The "IT Army of Ukraine," a volunteer cyber warfare organization, has explicitly identified BelTA as a target. This targeting is not an attack on journalism; it is a calculated act of digital warfare. In modern hybrid conflicts, entities that conduct information and psychological operations are considered integral components of an adversary's war-making capability.

B. Information as a Weapon: Disrupting the Propaganda Machine

Offensive cyber operations against BelTA serve multiple purposes for Ukraine: disrupting the flow of disinformation, seizing the platform for counter-messaging, gathering intelligence, and delivering a psychological blow to the Lukashenka regime.

C. Strategic Implications

The deliberate targeting of BelTA by Ukrainian cyber forces confirms that the information domain is a critical front in the war against Russia. Given BelTA's deep integration with the Russian state's security and information apparatus, an attack on BelTA is functionally an attack on a component of the Russian war machine.

In final assessment, the Belarusian Telegraph Agency is not a neutral observer. It is a state-owned, state-funded, and state-directed enterprise, managed by internationally sanctioned propagandists, and structurally integrated into a unified Russian-Belarusian media holding. Its designation as a legitimate military-informational target by Ukraine is strategically sound, tactically logical, and fully justified.