Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Kateryna Stepanenko, Nate Trotter, Kelly Campa, and Fredrick W. Kagan
December 23, 2024, 9:15pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:45pm ET on December 23. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the December 24 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Russian forces are gradually advancing south and southwest of Pokrovsk, but it remains unclear if Russian forces will be able to exploit these gains to envelop the town or if they intend to advance to the administrative boundary of Donetsk Oblast. Geolocated footage published on December 23 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced south of and within eastern Novovasylivka (southwest of Pokrovsk), and a Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Novovasylivka towards Solone and Vovkove and are attacking towards Kotlyne.[1] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are focusing their attacks on Novotroitske (east of Novovasylivka) and Dachenske (south of Pokrovsk) and forced Ukrainian forces to withdraw to the Lysivka-Pishchane line (southeast to south of Pokrovsk).[2] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces are also advancing from Pustynka and Pushkine (both further south of Pokrovsk) towards Ukrainka (southwest of Pushkine). ISW previously assessed that the Russian military command intends to envelop Pokrovsk via a turning maneuver from the south, but Russian advances southwest of Pokrovsk could be aimed at widening the Russian salient in preparation for the envelopment of Pokrovsk from the south or alternatively for advancing westward to the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative border as part of the Kremlin's political and informational objective of seizing the entirety of Donetsk Oblast.[3]
It remains unclear which effort the Russian military command will prioritize, as Russian President Vladimir Putin may have tasked the Russian military with securing territorial gains rather than seizing significant settlements. Putin stated during his annual Direct Line televised press conference on December 19 that Russian forces are advancing not in "100, 200, 300 meters" but in square kilometers throughout the frontline, and Putin appears to be increasingly characterizing Russian advances in terms of square kilometers instead of highlighting the seizure of particular settlements as he had previously done.[4] Putin may have instructed the Russian military command to delay the seizure of Pokrovsk in favor of making further gains through open fields and small settlements, particularly as Russian forces advance closer to the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative boundary. ISW has observed geolocated evidence sufficient to assess that Russian forces are within 10 kilometers of the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative boundary, and Putin may be pressuring the Russian military command to advance to the boundary rather than to envelop Pokrovsk at this time. Seizing the remainder of Donetsk Oblast is one of Putin's long-standing objectives in Ukraine, and Putin would likely highlight Russian advances up to the boundary to make outsized claims about Russian successes in Ukraine for both foreign and domestic audiences.[5] An organized offensive operation against well-defended towns could slow the rate of Russian advance during a critical moment in the Kremlin's efforts to project the inevitability of Russian military victory on the global stage.
The Russian military command appears to have split responsibility for the Pokrovsk direction between the Central Military District's 2nd and 41st combined arms armies (CAAs), and ISW has yet to observe significant Russian activity in the 41st CAA's area of responsibility (AoR). Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that the Russian military command has mainly concentrated elements of the 2nd CAA south and southeast of Pokrovsk and elements of the 41st CAA east and northeast of Pokrovsk in the directions of Myrnohrad and Novoekonomichne with the exception of the 90th Tank Division, which is mainly attacking south of Pokrovsk near Novotroitske towards Novoolenivka and Ukrainka (south of Novotroitske).[6] Mashovets noted that the 2nd CAA has a wider AoR extending from Novotroitske to Lysivka (east to southeast of Pokrovsk) and that the Russian military command may be preparing to activate the 41st CAA east and northeast of Pokrovsk in the near future. Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 433rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA), 228th Motorized Rifle Regiment (90th Tank Division, 41st CAA, CMD), and likely the 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA) have recently struggled to advance further along the Novotroitske-Shevchenko-Novyi Trud-Dachenske line due to successful Ukrainian counterattacks.[7] Russian forces have remained relatively inactive in the 41st CAA's reported AoR since late October 2024 and will have to make significant advances in the direction of Novoekonomichne and Rodynske (both northeast of Pokrovsk) or towards and into Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) in the near future if Russian forces intend to envelop Pokrovsk from both the northeast and southwest.[8] The relatively lower level of activity east and northeast of Pokrovsk indicates that the Russian military command may currently be prioritizing advances to the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative boundary over the envelopment of Pokrovsk.
Decreased combat effectiveness among Russian forces may be slowing the rate of Russian advance in the Pokrovsk direction. Mashovets suggested that elements of the Russian 90th Tank Division have suffered significant personnel losses and are struggling to make further advances south of Pokrovsk and north of Kurakhove due to decreased combat capabilities.[9] Elements of the 90th Tank Division reportedly participated in the seizure of Avdiivka in February 2024 and have remained committed to various sectors of the Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove directions since then.[10] A Ukrainian brigade officer recently estimated that Russian forces lost nearly 3,000 personnel in the Pokrovsk direction in two weeks in mid-December 2024, and the 90th Tank Division has likely suffered significant personnel losses in the Pokrovsk direction and other directions where it was previously committed.[11] It is unlikely that the Russian military command has granted the division's various units extended periods of leave to rest and reconstitute over the last year as the Russian military command largely viewed the 90th Tank Division as its primary exploitation formation in 2024.[12] ISW recently observed geolocated footage showing Russian forces conducting a motorized assault with civilian vehicles east of Ukrainka — within the 90th Tank Division's AoR — suggesting that the division may also be struggling to replace armored vehicle losses while engaged in frontline combat.[13]
Increased Russian armored vehicle losses over the last year, particularly among Russian units and formations that have been engaged in frontline combat for most of 2024, may be impacting Russia's rate of advance in certain sectors of the frontline. A social media source tracking Russian military depots via satellite imagery shared an updated assessment of Russian tank and armored vehicle storage facilities on December 22 and assessed that Russian forces have 47 percent of their pre-war tank reserves, 52 percent of pre-war infantry fighting vehicle reserves, and 45 percent of pre-war armored personnel carrier reserves remaining in storage as of a recent unspecified date.[14] The social media source's data suggests that Russian forces have used all of their pre-war T-90 tanks and most of their T-80 tanks thus far but still have most of their older T-72, T-64/62, and T-54/55 tanks in storage. The social media source noted that Russian forces will not be able to field these older tanks as the tanks have likely been degraded by weather and time. ISW is unable to independently verify the social media source's characterizations of the quality of various Russian tanks and armored vehicles based on satellite imagery as Russian forces may also be cannibalizing older tanks to repair newer tanks operating in Ukraine, which would be difficult to determine based on satellite imagery alone. Russian forces may also have additional armored vehicles and tanks in covered storage that are not visible in satellite imagery.
Armored vehicle limitations among Russian forces likely differ among sectors of the frontline, as Russian forces conducted battalion-sized mechanized assaults in the Siversk direction on November 2 and December 15 and a reinforced company-sized mechanized assault in the Kupyansk direction on October 19.[15] Russian forces operating in the Siversk and Kupyansk directions — frontline areas with a relatively lower tempo of Russian offensive operations over the last few months — may currently have more armored vehicles because they have not been conducting armored assaults and taking armored vehicles losses at the same intensity as Russian forces in the Pokrovsk and Kurakhove directions. The Russian military may, however, be struggling to reequip Russian frontline units and formations because the Russian military command does not want to withdraw Russian units for rest and reconstitution and risk further slowing Russian advances in high-priority frontline sectors.
North Korea is reportedly planning to deploy more troops and weapons to Russia amid reports that over 3,000 North Korean troops have been killed and wounded in Kursk Oblast. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on December 23 that over 3,000 North Korean troops have been killed and wounded in Kursk Oblast — roughly a fourth of the total 12,000 North Korean troops deployed to Russia.[16] The South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff reported on December 23 that at least 1,100 North Korean troops have been wounded and killed in Kursk Oblast and that North Korea appears to be preparing to deploy an unspecified number of additional troops and military equipment to Russia, possibly including loitering munitions.[17] The South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff added that it is unclear if North Korea is rotating troops out of Russia or increasing the deployment of troops to Russia. Russian authorities continue attempts to conceal the presence of North Korean soldiers operating in Kursk Oblast. Ukraine's Special Operations Forces (SSO) reported that the Russian military is issuing North Korean troops fake identification documents with Russian names and the Republic of Tuva as their birthplace.[18] A Ukrainian brigade posted footage on December 23 describing Russian-North Korean troop interaction in Kursk Oblast as minimal with no joint training or cooperation between Russian and North Korean units.[19] ISW previously observed reports that poor communication and coordination due to language barriers between Russian and North Korean forces are hindering Russian combat operations in Kursk Oblast.[20] The language barrier reportedly continues to create difficulties in communication and coordination, and North Korean forces are reportedly conducting the initial assaults against Ukrainian positions - after which Russian forces advance and secure positions.[21]
North Korea continues to provide Russia with weapons and troops in exchange for Russian oil, cash, and military technology that violate international sanctions. The New York Times (NYT) reported on December 23, citing unspecified US officials, that US intelligence agencies assessed that North Korea originally proposed the idea of deploying North Korean troops to Russia — not the Kremlin.[22] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko told the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) in an article published on December 23 that 60 percent of the artillery and mortar shells that Russian forces use in Ukraine come from North Korea.[23] Unspecified Ukrainian officials also told the WSJ that Russian forces conducted almost one third of their ballistic missile strikes against Ukraine in 2024 with North Korean-provided missiles. The WSJ reported that North Korea originally provided Russia with "decades-old" ammunition, likely in Fall 2023, but is now supplying Russia with "newer" munitions such as 240mm multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) with "new guidance and control systems." The WSJ reported that unspecified South Korean officials stated that Russia is transferring fuel and equipment to support the North Korean defense industrial base (DIB) and that 200 North Korean munitions factories are currently operating at full capacity. The WSJ added, citing satellite imagery, that North Korea is expanding a missile manufacturing facility that produces KN-23 and KN-24 ballistic missiles. The WSJ reported, citing unspecified South Korean officials, that Russia is providing air defense systems and sending technicians to aid North Korea's spy satellite operations, and that North Korea likely seeks intercontinental ballistic missile technology from Russia. The WSJ reported that the London-based Open Source Centre assessed that Russia has provided North Korea with over one million barrels of oil since March 2024 — double the annual cap imposed under United Nations sanctions.[24] The WSJ also reported that Olena Guseinova, a researcher at the Hankuk University of Foreign Studies in Seoul, assessed that Russia could have paid up to $5.5 billion in arms deals since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and that Russia may be paying up to up to $572 million yearly for the North Korean troop deployment to Russia.
Russian President Vladimir Putin used his meeting with Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico to advance Russia's campaign to undermine Western unity in supporting Ukraine. Putin and Fico met in Moscow on December 22 for the first time since 2016, marking the third visit by a European Union (EU) official to Russia since Russia launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.[25] Putin and Fico reportedly discussed Ukraine's decision to not transit Russian gas starting January 1, 2025, and exchanged views about Russia's war in Ukraine.[26] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov announced that Fico and Putin would not host a joint press conference or offer joint statements following the meeting.[27] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin cultivates relationships with individual Western and NATO members to leverage these relationships to exacerbate fissures within the West and undermine support for Ukraine.[28]
The Kremlin may be setting information conditions for a false flag in the pro-Russian breakaway region of Transnistria likely in a continued attempt to destabilize Moldova and hinder its integration into European Union (EU). The Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) claimed on December 23 that Moldovan President Maia Sandu is preparing a plan for a military operation in Transnistria and speculated that this military operation may lead to a war.[29] The SVR added that Sandu called on the government to develop a plan to establish control over Transnistria and eliminate the Russian presence in the region during a meeting with Moldova's energy security leadership.[30] A milblogger affiliated with the Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) insinuated that Sandu is planning to attack Transnistria in retaliation for Russia stopping its gas transit via Ukraine.[31] The milblogger identified the possible place for the false flag attack as the Cuciurgan Power Station in Transnistria. Sandu's Chief of Staff Andrian Balutel responded to the SVR claims, stating that Moldova is not preparing military operations in Transnistria and that these claims are "are serious and dangerous disinformation, designed to sow panic and distrust."[32] Moldovan Prime Minister Dorin Recean also stated that SVR claims are part of the Kremlin's "hybrid war," and the Moldovan Reintegration Policy Bureau reiterated that the Kremlin is trying to destabilize Moldova.[33] The Kremlin had historically used gas and energy blackmail in attempts to destabilize internal Moldovan affairs and may be using Ukraine's refusal to extend the gas transit deal to spread panic and distrust in Moldovan society towards the pro-Western Sandu government.[34] The Kremlin may also be setting information conditions for a false flag operation in Transnistria, however.
Russian forces have reportedly withdrawn completely from most of their positions in Syria, including their base at Qamishli in northern Syria. (NOTE: A version of this text also appears in ISW-CTP's December 23 Iran Update.) Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated on December 23 that Russian elements completed their withdrawal from all positions in Syria’s interior and are now only present at Hmeimim Air Base and the Port of Tartus.[35] CTP-ISW cannot independently confirm the GUR report, though it is consistent with the pace of Russian military evacuations from Syria since the fall of Assad. CTP-ISW last observed Russian forces present at the Qamishli base, Hasakah Province, on December 18, suggesting that Russian elements fully evacuated the base in the days since.[36] Russia still maintains a presence in coastal Syria at Hmeimim Air Base and the port of Tartus, but visual evidence and Syrian reporting continue to indicate that Russian forces are preparing to either significantly draw down or withdraw fully from coastal Syria.[37] The GUR stated on December 23 that a Russian cargo ship that broke down in the Mediterranean Sea was traveling to Syria to evacuate Russian equipment and weapons from Tartus.[38] The GUR stated on December 23 that Russia and the "new [Syrian] authorities," likely referring to the Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-led interim government, have continued negotiations and have discussed alleged Syrian demands that Russia withdraw from Hmeimim and Tartus no later than February 20, 2025.[39] Russian Presidential Aide Yuri Ushakov stated on December 23 that Russia is in contact with the new authorities in Syria through both diplomatic and military channels.[40]
Germany announced additional military assistance for Ukraine on December 23. The German government announced that Germany will deliver two Patriot launcher systems; 15 Leopard 1 A5 tanks and ammunition for Leopard 1 and Leopard 2 tanks; two Gepard self-propelled anti-aircraft guns and 65,000 ammunition rounds for Gepard guns; 30 Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles; one Panzerhaubitzen 2000 self-propelled howitzer; 12 armored vehicles with kinetic defense systems; seven Caracal amphibious vehicles; one IRIS-T SLM anti-aircraft missile system with missiles; one IRIS-T SLS anti-aircraft missile system; two TRML 4-D aerial radar systems; one AIM-9L/I-1 Sidewinder guided missile; 68 reconnaissance drones of Vector, RQ-Heidrun, and Hornet XR type; explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) materiel, tank and artillery munitions; logistics and special purpose vehicles; and small arms ammunition.[41] Ukraine's Defense Procurement Agency announced on December 20 that German arms manufacturer Rheinmetall will supply Ukraine with 155mm artillery rounds, with the first delive
