Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 13, 2025
Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, Olivia Gibson, Grace Mappes, Nate Trotter, William Runkel, and Frederick W. Kagan
January 13, 2025, 5:30pm ET
Click here
to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This
map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click here
to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a
computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this
data-heavy tool.
Click here
to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian
invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain
map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will
update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:30am ET on
January 13. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the January 14 Russian
Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Russian forces recently cut the T-0504
Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway east of Pokrovsk and the T-0406
Pokrovsk-Mezhova highway southwest of Pokrovsk as part of their efforts
to envelop Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad. Geolocated footage published
on January 12 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of
Myrne (east of Pokrovsk) and seized positions along the T-0504
highway.[1] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on
January 13 that elements of the Russian 55th and 74th motorized rifle
brigades (41st Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District
[CMD]) recently advanced to and cut the T-0406 highway between Kotlyne
and Udachne (both southwest of Pokrovsk), and Russian milbloggers
claimed that Russian forces seized a section of both highways.[2] ISW
assesses that Russian forces likely seized the remainder of Solone
(southwest of Pokrovsk) as part of this advance. Mashovets stated that
Russian forces are deploying the 55th and 74th motorized rifle brigades
in a two-echelon formation and that elements of the 74th Brigade conduct
the initial attacks and elements of the 55th Brigade follow behind to
consolidate positions. Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian
239th Tank Regiment, 228th Motorized Rifle Regiment, and 67th Rifle
Regiment (all 90th Tank Division, CMD) are operating in the
Novovasylivka-Uspenivka-Novooleksandriivka area (southwest of
Pokrovsk).[3] Mashovets acknowledged that the Russian military command
recently redeployed elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade
(51st CAA, formerly the 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR
AC]) from the Kurakhove direction to offensive operations near
Vozdvyzhenka (east of Pokrovsk), further substantiating previous
milblogger claims that the 5th Brigade was redeployed to the
Vozdvyzhenka area[4] Elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade may
have participated in the interdiction of the T-0405 highway near Myrne,
and the Russian military command's decision to redeploy the 5th
Motorized Rifle Brigade suggests that it is prioritizing efforts to
advance in this area and envelop Pokrovsk from the east over further
advances west of Kurakhove. ISW previously noted that Russian forces
could also leverage advances east of Pokrovsk near Vozdvyzhenka and
Myrne to eliminate the Ukrainian salient southwest of Toretsk along the
H-20 Donetsk City-Kostyantynivka highway.[5]
Russian forces also advanced in other areas southwest of Pokrovsk
amid ongoing efforts to envelop the town on January 12. Geolocated
footage published on January 13 indicates that Russian forces seized
Pishchane (southwest of Pokrovsk), and the Russian Ministry of Defense
(MoD) credited elements of the 55th, 35th, and 74th motorized rifle
brigades (all 41st CAA, CMD) with the seizure of the settlement.[6]
Russian forces continued attacking near Pokrovsk itself; northeast of
Pokrovsk near Baranivka, Zelene Pole, Nova Poltavka, and Tarasivka; east
of Pokrovsk near Novotoretske, Novooleksandrivka, Myrolyubivka,
Yelyzavetivka, Promin, and Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near
Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novyi Trud, Zelene, and Shevchenko;
southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne, Uspenivka, Novovasylivka,
Novoandriivka, Sribne, and Yasenove; and west of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne
on January 12 and 13.[7]
Russian forces likely intend to interdict Ukrainian ground
lines of communications (GLOCs) into Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad in order to
force Ukrainian units to withdraw from the towns in future months. The
T-0405 and T-0406 highways are two of the three main east-west GLOCs
supporting the Ukrainian force grouping in the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad area.
Russian advances east and west of Pokrovsk may complicate Ukrainian
logistics and Ukraine's ability to resupply and redeploy troops to
defend Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad. The Russian military command may intend
to make further advances north of the T-0405 and T-0406 highways in an
effort to force Ukrainian forces to eventually withdraw to the north
(rather than to the east or west) to support Russia's envelopment of
both settlements and further advances west towards the
Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative border. The Russian
military command likely also hopes to avoid conducting infantry-heavy
frontal assaults through the urban areas of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad and
likely assesses that interdicting these GLOCs increases the likelihood
that Ukrainian forces will withdraw from these towns and that Russian
forces will be able to avoid conducting costly urban combat operations
to take the towns.
Russian state-owned energy corporation Gazprom acknowledged
that it is considering reducing the size of its central office staff by
40 percent, indicating that Gazprom may be concerned about the long-term
effects that the war in Ukraine and the reduction in Russian gas
exports to Europe will have on the Russian gas industry. Leningrad-based media outlet 47news,
which is affiliated with Russian state censor Roskomnadzor, reported on
January 13 that Gazprom's Deputy CEO, Elena Ilyukhina, sent a proposal
to the company's CEO, Alexei Miller, on December 23 arguing that
Gazprom's central office in St. Petersburg should cut its staff by 40
percent from 4,100 to 2,500.[8] Ilyukhina's proposal to shrink Gazprom's
workforce is likely an effort to address economic strains due to the
reduction of Russian gas exports to Europe since 2022 and Ukraine's
recent refusal to renew a contract to transport Russian gas to Europe
via Ukraine.[9] Gazprom official representative Sergei Kupriyanov
confirmed the authenticity of the proposal on January 13 during an
interview with Kremlin newswire TASS but declined to comment further.[10]
Key Takeaways:
- Russian forces recently cut the T-0405
Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway east of Pokrovsk and the T-0406
Pokrovsk-Mezhova highway southwest of Pokrovsk as part of their efforts
to envelop Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad.
- Russian forces likely intend to interdict Ukrainian ground
lines of communications (GLOCs) into Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad in order to
force Ukrainian units to withdraw from the towns in future months.
- Russian state-owned energy corporation Gazprom acknowledged
that it is considering reducing the size of its central office staff by
40 percent, indicating that Gazprom may be concerned about the long-term
effects that the war in Ukraine and the reduction in Russian gas
exports to Europe will have on the Russian gas industry.
- Russian forces recently advanced in the Kharkiv, Borova, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka directions.
- South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) reportedly
announced that North Korean casualties in Kursk Oblast total roughly
3,000 killed and wounded.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because
these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly
affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will
continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal
activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and
specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn
Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva
Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe
them in these reports.
- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from
the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within
tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of
Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and
encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Significant Activity in Belarus
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Ukrainian
salient in Kursk Oblast on January 13 but did not make any confirmed
advances. Russian milbloggers claimed that fighting continued northwest
of Sudzha near Pogrebki and Kruglenkoye; northeast of Sudzha near
Russkoye Porechnoye; and southeast of Sudzha near Makhnovka.[11]
Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) reported on January 13 that
they recently repelled a North Korean infantry assault in Kursk Oblast
that lasted from morning until night.[12]
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on January 13 that
Ukrainian drones attempted to strike the Russkaya compressor station in
Gai-Kodzor, Krasnodar Krai, which is a part of the Russian-Turkish Turk
Stream gas pipeline, on January 11.[13] The Russian MoD claimed that
Russian forces shot down all nine drones and that falling drone
fragments damaged a building and equipment at a gas metering station,
but that the strike did not disrupt the station's operations. ISW has
not observed independent reporting about the purported strike.
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian
objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border
with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of
Kharkiv City)
Russian forces recently marginally advanced northeast of Kharkiv City
amid continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on
January 12 and 13. Geolocated footage published on January 12 indicates
that Russian forces recently marginally advanced in a forested area on
the northeastern outskirts of Tykhe (northeast of Kharkiv City).[14] A
Russian milblogger claimed on January 13 that Russian forces also made
unspecified advances within Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City), but
ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[15] Russian forces
conducted offensive operations along the international border north of
Kharkiv City near Kozacha Lopan and near Vovchansk on January 12 and
13.[16] The deputy commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the
Kharkiv direction reported on January 13 that Russian forces are not
fielding armored vehicles or buggies for assaults due to the threat of
Ukrainian drones.[17] The commander reported that Russian forces conduct
assaults by sending poorly-trained, ”disposable” soldiers to assault
Ukrainian positions after which better trained soldiers follow. The
commander added that Russian forces have roughly halved their tempo of
operations in the Kharkiv direction in recent days.
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast
(Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push
westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk
direction on January 13 but did not advance. Ukrainian military observer
Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 69th Motorized
Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military
District [LMD]) significantly expanded their bridgehead along the Oskil
River near Dvorichna (northwest of Kupyansk), hold positions in half of
Dvorichna, and are likely attempting to advance along the
Dvorichna-Kupyansk P-79 road toward Kindrashivka (northwest of Kupyansk
and southwest of Dvorichna).[18] ISW has not observed confirmation of
these claims, however. Russian forces attacked northeast of Kupyansk
near Dvorichna, Zapadne, and Kindrashivka and east of Kupyansk near
Petropavlivka on January 12 and 13.[19] The commander of a Ukrainian
battalion operating in the Kupyansk direction noted on January 13 that
Russian forces are attempting to leverage inclement weather conditions
to cross the Oskil River on small boats and rafts and are accumulating
forces in the direction of Dvorichna and Masyutivka (south of
Dvorichna).[20] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating along
the Kupyansk-Lyman line stated that Russian forces are using artillery,
air, and drone strikes to support ground activity against Ukrainian
defenses in the Kupyansk and Lyman directions.[21] The spokesperson
noted that Russian forces are currently not using vehicles during
assaults due to softened terrain and are using up to 30 to 40 first
person-view (FPV) drones to strike a single target in this area. Drone
operators of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's
Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk
direction.[22]
Russian forces recently advanced amid continued offensive operations
in the Borova direction on January 13. Geolocated footage published on
January 13 indicates that Russian forces advanced west of Makiivka
(southeast of Borova).[23] Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova
near Lozova, Zeleny Hai, and Pishchane; east of Borova near Pershotravne
and Kopanky and in the direction of Shyikivka; and southeast of Borova
near Makiivka, Novoserhiivka, and Tverdokhlibove on January 12 and
13.[24] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are clearing
Ukrainian forces from Zahryzove (northeast of Borova) and Zeleny Hai,
and that Russian forces established an unspecified crossing over the
Oskil River between Kruhlyakivka and Senkove (both northeast of
Borova).[25]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction
on January 13 but did not advance. Russian milbloggers claimed on
January 13 that Russian forces marginally advanced toward Kolodyazi
(northeast of Lyman), but ISW has not observed confirmation of this
claim.[26] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces are
attempting to create a bridgehead on the west (right) bank of the
Zherebets River.[27] Russian forces attacked northeast of Lyman near
Terny and east of Lyman near Zarichne on January 12 and 13.[28] The
commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk-Lyman
direction reported that Russian forces typically use vehicles to
transport personnel past Ukrainian forces' first line of defense and
then deploy infantrymen to reinforce the dismounted units and attempt to
consolidate forward Russian positions.[29] The commander observed that
Russian forces are not fielding FPV drones in the brigade's area of
responsibility (AoR) but are occasionally using reconnaissance drones.
The commander assessed that there is a 1:1 artillery ratio in the
brigade's AoR in the Lyman direction.[30] Drone operators of the Russian
3rd Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, Moscow Military District [MMD])
are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[31]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations northeast of
Siversk near Bilohorivka on January 13 but did not make any confirmed
advances.[32]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar
direction on January 13 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian
milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 200th Motorized Rifle
Brigade (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) seized
half of Pivichnyi Microraion and the fourth workshop of the Refractory
Plant in central Chasiv Yar and that elements of the Russian 331st
Airborne (VDV) Division (98th VDV Division) seized the main part of the
Refractory Plant.[33] The milbloggers also claimed that elements of the
Russian 299th VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division) and the 4th Motorized
Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk
People’s Republic [LNR] AC) cleared most of the Stupky-Holubovskyi
forest (south of Chasiv Yar). ISW has not observed visual confirmation
of these claims, however.[34]Russian forces conducted offensive
operations within Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar near
Stupochky and Bila Hora on January 12 and 13[35] A Russian milblogger
claimed on January 13 that Ukrainian forces conducted infantry-led and
mechanized counterattacks in Chasiv Yar.[36]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk
direction on January 13 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian
milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized most of Toretsk and
pushed Ukrainian forces to the northern outskirts of Toretsk and
speculated that Russian forces will soon seize the remainder of
Toretsk.[37] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces occupy
about 94 percent of Toretsk, although ISW assesses that Russian forces
have occupied 81.4 percent of the settlement as of January 13.[38]
Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on January 13
that elements of the Russian 1st and 9th motorized rifle brigades (both
of the 51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC) have
seized most of central Toretsk but that Ukrainian forces still hold part
of Toretsk and Krymske (northeast of Toretsk).[39] Russian forces
conducted offensive operations near Toretsk itself, northeast of Toretsk
near Krymske, and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on January 12 and
13.[40] Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 132nd Motorized
Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are operating in the Nelipivka-Leonidivka
direction (south of Toretsk).[41] Drone operators of the 132nd Motorized
Rifle Brigade reportedly continue operating near Toretsk.[42]
See topline for updates in the Pokrovsk direction.
Geolocated footage published on January 12 showing Ukrainian forces
striking a Russian occupied building in southeastern Novohrodivka
(southeast of Pokrovsk) likely shows Ukrainian forces striking a command
post of the Russian 2nd Combined Arms Army [CAA] (Central Military
District [CMD]).[43] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 12
that Ukrainian forces conducted a high-precision airstrike on a 2nd CAA
command post in Novohrodivka.[44]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Kurakhove direction amid
continued offensive operations in the area on January 13. Geolocated
footage published on January 12 indicates that Russian forces recently
advanced southeast of Dachne (west of Kurakhove).[45] Russian
milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Yantarne
(southwest of Kurakhove), but ISW has not observed confirmation of this
claim.[46] Russian forces continued attacking near Kurakhove itself;
northwest of Kurakhove near Slovyanka, Petropavlivka, and Shevchenko;
west of Kurakhove near Dachne; and southwest of Kurakhove near Yantarne
on January 12 and 13.[47] Elements of the Russian 346th Spetsnaz Brigade
(Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly
operating near Kurakhove.[48] Mashovets stated that elements of the
Russian 163rd Tank Regiment, 102nd and 103rd motorized rifle regiments
(150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD), and 33rd and 255th
motorized rifle regiments (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD)
are operating in the Kurakhove-Dachne-Dalne area.[49] Mashovets stated
that elements of the Russian 242nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th
Motorized Rifle Division) are attempting to advance along the Sukhi Yaly
River north of Kostyantnynolske (southwest of Kurakhove) and that
elements of the 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military
District [EMD]), 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th Army Corps, EMD),
57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, EMD), and 114th Motorized Rifle
Brigade (51st CAA) are operating near Yantarne.[50]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Velyka Novosilka direction
amid continued offensive operations in the area on January 13.
Geolocated footage published on January 12 and 13 indicates that Russian
forces operating north of Velyka Novosilka advanced to the east (left)
bank of the Mokri Yaly River southwest of Novyi Komar and that Russian
forces likely seized Neskuchne (southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[51] Some
Russian sources claimed on January 12 and 13 that Russian forces have
not yet seized Neskuchne and that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in
northern Neskuchne, however.[52] A Russian milblogger claimed on
January 12 Russian forces are one kilometer from the final Ukrainian
logistics lines near Velyka Novosilka.[53] Mashovets stated on January
13 that Russian forces have nearly completed their envelopment of
Vremivka and Velyka Novosilka from the north, south, and southeast and
forecast that Russian forces may conduct a "decisive" operation to seize
the settlements in the coming days.[54] Russian forces continued
attacking west of Velyka Novosilka near Vremivka and southwest of Velyka
Novosilka near Rivnopil and Neskuchne on January 12 and 13.[55]
Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 127th Motorized Rifle
Division (5th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) continue fighting
for the Velyka Novosilka – Uspenivka road between Novosilka (west of
Velyka Novosilka) and Vremivka and that elements of the Russian 37th
Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) with support from elements of
the 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet, LMD) are fighting near
Novyi Komar.[56]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Positional fighting continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on January
12 and 13 but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. A
Russian milblogger claimed on January 13 that Russian forces usually
conduct reconnaissance-in-force operations in small groups in western
Zaporizhia Oblast.[57]Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces
reported on January 11 that Ukrainian forces successfully struck a
Russian Tor-M2 air defense system on an unknown date in the past week
(roughly between January 4 to 11) in the Zaporizhia direction.[58]
Drone operators of the Russian “Nemets” Group of the 291st Motorized
Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army
[CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue to operate
in the Zaporizhia direction.[59]
Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Dnipro direction on January 12 and 13 but did not make any advances.[60]
A Russian milblogger claimed on January 12 that Ukrainian forces
targeted the Kerch Strait Bridge with 43 drones overnight on January 10
to 11 but that Russian forces downed all the drones.[61] The milblogger
asserted that the drones attempted to strike the Kerch Strait
Bridge.[62] The Crimea-based Ukrainian "Atesh" partisan organization
reported on January 13 that Russian forces recently deployed additional
S-400 air defense systems and radar systems to the Hvardiske Airfield in
Simferopol, occupied Crimea.[63]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on
the night of on January 12 to 13. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that
Russian forces launched 110 Shahed and other strike and decoy drones
from Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and
Oryol and Bryansk oblasts.[64] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that
Ukrainian forces downed 78 drones over Poltava, Sumy, Kharkiv, Cherkasy,
Chernihiv, Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, Zaporizhia, Zhytomyr,
Khmelnytskyi and Donetsk oblasts; that 31 decoy drones were ”lost,”
likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference; and that
debris from downed drones damaged enterprises, homes, and state
buildings in Sumy, Kyiv, Zhytomyr, and Zaporizhia oblasts. Ukrainian
officials reported that debris from downed Russian drones also damaged a
children’s health center in Sumy City, a critical infrastructure
facility in Putyvlskyi Hromada, Sumy Oblast, and a medical facility in
Kyiv Oblast.[65]
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) reportedly
announced that North Korean casualties in Kursk Oblast total roughly
3,000 killed and wounded. The NIS reportedly announced at a closed-door
meeting on January 13 that roughly 300 North Koreans were killed in
action (KIA) and roughly 2,700 wounded in action (WIA) in Russia.[66]
The NIS reportedly attributed the high casualty rate to the way Russian
forces utilize North Korean forces and conduct assaults without fire
support, which coheres with ISW's previous assessments and observations
about North Korean tactics and communication issues with Russian
forces.[67]
Russian authorities are reportedly walking back a promise to allocate
federal budget funds to protect certain deep rear areas from Ukrainian
strikes. Russian news organization Vedomosti reported on
January 13, citing its sources close to the Russian Ministry of
Transport, that Russian authorities will not fund anti-drone measures
from the federal budget for Category 1 airports within Russia, including
airports in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Sochi, Kazan, Omsk, Chelyabinsk,
Krasnoyarsk, Yekaterinburg, and Novosibirsk.[68] Vedomosti reported
in September 2024 citing sources familiar with the matter that Russian
authorities planned to allocate over 11 billion rubles (about $107
million) to equip 31 major Russian airports with anti-drone measures by
2028 as part of a national effort to develop infrastructure and security
regarding drone usage.[69] ISW has recently assessed that Russia is
struggling with the increasingly high costs of maintaining its war
effort against Ukraine, and reducing funding for air defenses to protect
areas far from the battlefield may be part of a Kremlin effort to limit
some of these costs.[70]
Russian authorities continue increasing social service benefits to
Russian veterans of the war in Ukraine likely as part of efforts to
increase military recruitment. The Russian Government announced on
January 13 that it began allocating grants on January 1 of up to seven
million rubles (about $68,126) to Russian veterans to start their own
agricultural and livestock enterprises.[71]
Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)
Russian milbloggers claimed on January 12 and 13 that Russian forces
started fielding a North Korean analogue to Russian "Tor" air defense
systems. Russian milbloggers amplified an image allegedly showing the
North Korean air defense system, which the milbloggers did not name, in
an unspecified location in Ukraine or Russia.[72] One milblogger claimed
that a Russian first-person view (FPV) drone struck a North
Korean-provided air defense system due to misidentifying it as an enemy
target.[73] ISW is unable to confirm these claims.
Activities in Russian-occupied areas
(Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed
areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural,
economic, military, and governance systems)
ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any
source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively
on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as
commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as
the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided
in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8097; https://t.me/osirskiy/1034
[2] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2488 ;
https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61376 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20507 ;
https://t.me/yurasumy/20508 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/151170 ;
https://t.me/politadequate/9424; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/151228
[3] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2488
[4] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2488 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2489 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar010525
[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-7-2025
[6] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8102; https://t.me/urga_74/3182 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/47836 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/47847
[7]
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02TRPBfwfiAQY4xhBUguVNjBnkVKxxwQsyLXhRK3167GDXH4dEjYjPKyVca31GnQSDl
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0CF9hjfQNwM9nibLUwJsHYVedfNdFLJue1ruKMGJ2uPgd31TN3vkm7uUJsPs1HH4Ll
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DWktH3CKE3t2erF3PDj5q7jWLrdngPmeMC7t47jF4ReRngmmvscWR8un3tnQjpeRl
; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61376 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61382
; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61383 ;
[8] https://47news dot ru/articles/263385/ ;
https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russias-gazprom-plans-cut-staff-central-office-2025-01-13/
[9] https://isw.pub/UkrWar010225
[10] https://t.me/tass_agency/295760
[11] https://t.me/wargonzo/24239 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/62346 ;
https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22311 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/62346
[12] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1628623794420170&rdid=hNDNmTxQuh9ETuRM
[13] https://t.me/mod_russia/47833
[14] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/24588 ; https://t.me/osirskiy/1034
[15] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12263
[16]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0CF9hjfQNwM9nibLUwJsHYVedfNdFLJue1ruKMGJ2uPgd31TN3vkm7uUJsPs1HH4Ll
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DWktH3CKE3t2erF3PDj5q7jWLrdngPmeMC7t47jF4ReRngmmvscWR8un3tnQjpeRl
[17] https://armyinform dot
com.ua/2025/01/13/zsu-zmusyly-rosiyan-vidmovytys-vid-vazhkoyi-tehniky-na-harkivshhyni-zastupnyk-komandyra-43-ombr/
[18] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2492
[19]
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02TRPBfwfiAQY4xhBUguVNjBnkVKxxwQsyLXhRK3167GDXH4dEjYjPKyVca31GnQSDl
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0CF9hjfQNwM9nibLUwJsHYVedfNdFLJue1ruKMGJ2uPgd31TN3vkm7uUJsPs1HH4Ll
; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12263 ;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DWktH3CKE3t2erF3PDj5q7jWLrdngPmeMC7t47jF4ReRngmmvscWR8un3tnQjpeRl
[20] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/923877-fedorenko-rozpoviv-so-vidbuvaetsa-u-dvoricnij-ta-na-kupanskomu-napramku-frontu/
[21] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KEto7vQytg4 ; https://suspilne
dot
media/donbas/915321-armia-rf-bila-na-pokrovska-boi-v-kurahovomu-torecku-casovomu-aru-front-na-donbasi-13-sicna/?anchor=live_1736757851&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps
[22] https://t.me/frontline_pvt/5537 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/12766
[23] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8106 ; https://t.me/pulse_of_the_front/4436
[24]
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02TRPBfwfiAQY4xhBUguVNjBnkVKxxwQsyLXhRK3167GDXH4dEjYjPKyVca31GnQSDl
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0CF9hjfQNwM9nibLUwJsHYVedfNdFLJue1ruKMGJ2uPgd31TN3vkm7uUJsPs1HH4Ll
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DWktH3CKE3t2erF3PDj5q7jWLrdngPmeMC7t47jF4ReRngmmvscWR8un3tnQjpeRl
; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/23943
[25] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12263
[26] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22292 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20511
[27] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22292
[28]
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02TRPBfwfiAQY4xhBUguVNjBnkVKxxwQsyLXhRK3167GDXH4dEjYjPKyVca31GnQSDl
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0CF9hjfQNwM9nibLUwJsHYVedfNdFLJue1ruKMGJ2uPgd31TN3vkm7uUJsPs1HH4Ll
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DWktH3CKE3t2erF3PDj5q7jWLrdngPmeMC7t47jF4ReRngmmvscWR8un3tnQjpeRl
[29] https://suspilne dot
media/donbas/919429-za-koznij-krok-vpered-voni-viddaut-desatki-zittiv-komandir-63-brigadi-rozpoviv-pro-oboronu-limana-ta-vtrati-armii-rf/
[30] https://suspilne dot
media/donbas/919429-za-koznij-krok-vpered-voni-viddaut-desatki-zittiv-komandir-63-brigadi-rozpoviv-pro-oboronu-limana-ta-vtrati-armii-rf/
[31] https://t.me/sashakots/51253
[32] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02TRPBfwfiAQY4xhBUguVNjBnkVKxxwQsyLXhRK3167GDXH4dEjYjPKyVca31GnQSDl
[33] https://t.me/rusich_army/20077; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61380
[34] https://t.me/rusich_army/20077; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61380
[35]
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02TRPBfwfiAQY4xhBUguVNjBnkVKxxwQsyLXhRK3167GDXH4dEjYjPKyVca31GnQSDl;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0CF9hjfQNwM9nibLUwJsHYVedfNdFLJue1ruKMGJ2uPgd31TN3vkm7uUJsPs1HH4Ll;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DWktH3CKE3t2erF3PDj5q7jWLrdngPmeMC7t47jF4ReRngmmvscWR8un3tnQjpeRl
[36] https://t.me/rusich_army/20077
[37] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61380; https://t.me/epoddubny/22148;
https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84352; https://t.me/notes_veterans/21407
[38] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/151167
[39] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2492
[40]
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02TRPBfwfiAQY4xhBUguVNjBnkVKxxwQsyLXhRK3167GDXH4dEjYjPKyVca31GnQSDl;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0CF9hjfQNwM9nibLUwJsHYVedfNdFLJue1ruKMGJ2uPgd31TN3vkm7uUJsPs1HH4Ll;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DWktH3CKE3t2erF3PDj5q7jWLrdngPmeMC7t47jF4ReRngmmvscWR8un3tnQjpeRl
[41] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2492
[42] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2492; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84369; https://t.me/nm_dnr/13254
[43] https://x.com/wartranslated/status/1878494201551401447;
https://t.me/supernova_plus/35209;
https://x.com/moklasen/status/1878526019201572986
[44] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-12-2025
[45] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8099; https://t.me/mechanized33/706
[46] https://t.me/motopatriot78/31291; https://t.me/z_arhiv/30503
[47]
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02TRPBfwfiAQY4xhBUguVNjBnkVKxxwQsyLXhRK3167GDXH4dEjYjPKyVca31GnQSDl
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0CF9hjfQNwM9nibLUwJsHYVedfNdFLJue1ruKMGJ2uPgd31TN3vkm7uUJsPs1HH4Ll
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DWktH3CKE3t2erF3PDj5q7jWLrdngPmeMC7t47jF4ReRngmmvscWR8un3tnQjpeRl
; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61371
[48] https://t.me/milinfolive/139705
[49] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2490
[50] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2491
[51] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8098; https://t.me/rubpak/254; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8108; https://t.me/voin_dv/12770
[52] https://t.me/vrogov/18721 ; https://ria dot
ru/20250113/spetsoperatsiya-1993414502.html?utm_source=yxnews&utm_medium=mobile&utm_referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fdzen.ru%2Fnews%2Fsearch;
https://t.me/dva_majors/62346; https://t.me/voin_dv/12755
[53] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61373
[54] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2492
[55]
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02TRPBfwfiAQY4xhBUguVNjBnkVKxxwQsyLXhRK3167GDXH4dEjYjPKyVca31GnQSDl;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0CF9hjfQNwM9nibLUwJsHYVedfNdFLJue1ruKMGJ2uPgd31TN3vkm7uUJsPs1HH4Ll;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DWktH3CKE3t2erF3PDj5q7jWLrdngPmeMC7t47jF4ReRngmmvscWR8un3tnQjpeRl;
https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61373
[56] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2492
[57] https://t.me/wargonzo/24245
[58] https://t.me/usf_army/340
[59] https://t.me/wargonzo/24245
[60]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0CF9hjfQNwM9nibLUwJsHYVedfNdFLJue1ruKMGJ2uPgd31TN3vkm7uUJsPs1HH4Ll
[61] https://t.me/rusich_army/20048
[62] https://t.me/rusich_army/20048
[63] https://t.me/atesh_ua/6159 ; https://suspilne dot
media/crimea/923503-okupanti-posilili-sistemami-ppo-aerodrom-gvardijske-v-krimu-ates/
[64] https://t.me/kpszsu/26736
[65] https://suspilne dot
media/sumy/923927-poluma-svidko-posiruvalos-ulamki-sahediv-spricinili-pozezu-i-rujnuvanna-u-sumah/
; https://t.me/Sumy_news_ODA/32865 ; https://t.me/astrapress/72279 ;
https://t.me/Sumy_news_ODA/32877 ; https://armyinform dot
com.ua/2025/01/13/na-sumshhyni-dron-vpav-na-krytychnu-infrastrukturu-185-naselenyh-punktiv-bez-svitla/
; https://t.me/Mykola_Kalashnyk/4269
[66] https://www.yna.co dot kr/view/AKR20250113084100001
[67]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-11-2025;
https://isw.pub/UkrWar122724; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122324;
https://isw.pub/UkrWar121524
[68] https://www.vedomosti dot
ru/politics/articles/2025/01/13/1085760-federalnii-byudzhet-ne-budet-finansirovat-zaschitu-aeroportov-ot-dronov;
https://www.fontanka dot ru/2025/01/13/74981597/
[69] https://www.vedomosti dot
ru/business/articles/2024/09/25/1064378-byudzhet-dast-ne-menee-11-mlrd-na-zaschitu-aeroportov-ot-dronov
[70] https://isw.pub/UkrWar120924
[71] https://www.vedomosti dot ru/society/news/2025/01/13/1085844-uchastniki-spetsoperatsii-smogut
[72] https://t.me/infomil_live/14007; https://t.me/rybar/67117; https://t.me/milinfolive/139686
[73] ttps://t.me/milinfolive/139686
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